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We use a fixed effects panel data model to investigate the impact of institutions of 
governance on the educational attainment of immigrants to the United States over the 
period 1988 – 2000. Distinguishing between the quality and stability of political 
institutions in the countries of origin, we find that the two characteristics of institutional 
structure have conflicting impacts on the nature of brain drain. Immigrants from countries 
with a higher quality of political institutions tend to be better educated, on the average, 
than immigrants from countries with institutions of lower quality. However, immigrants 
from countries with greater political instability tend to be better educated than immigrants 
from countries with more stable governments. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Immigration is a central theme in the globalization debate. Among the questions that have arisen 
in the discussion are: (1) what is the impact of immigration on welfare for the source and 
destination countries, and; (2) what are the distributional consequences of immigration for 
various interest groups? While most studies agree that there are net (but small) welfare gains for 
natives, the distributional question depends on many factors. One of these factors is whether or 
not the skill distribution of immigrants is representative of the distribution of skill in their 
respective home countries, or if immigrants are self-selected with some positive or negative skill 
bias. Because of its impact on the income distribution, selection bias may play a role in the 
politics of immigration policy. 
The theoretical work on the selection of immigrants leaves the issue as an empirical question, 
and existing empirical tests have been inconclusive. The consensus is that the direction and 
magnitude of the selection bias depends on the conditions in the immigrants' home countries. 
This paper aims to complement the literature on immigrant selection bias. We find empirical 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that immigrants to the U.S. are favorably selected. We also 
find that favorable selection is stronger for immigrants who come from countries with more 
corrupt governments, who travel farther to get to the U.S., and whose home countries have 
higher average levels of educational attainment. The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the selection and educational attainment of 
immigrants; Section 3 presents the empirical model and outlines the estimation methodology; 





II.  RELATED LITERATURE 
At a theoretical level, the cornerstone of the immigration literature is Mundell (1957), who 
predicts negative selection using a factor-endowments approach. Skill-abundant countries will 
receive mostly low-skill workers as a complement to comparative advantage through trade in 
factors. However, Chiswick (1978; 2001) predicts positive selection using a human capital model 
in which migrants compare the returns from migration to its moving and opportunity costs. 
Borjas (1987) finds that both patterns are possible using the Roy (1951) model of occupational 
selection. The theoretical literature on brain drain, such as Chakraborty (2006) and Docquier and 
Rapoport (2003), predicts positive selection and deserves mention for explaining immigration 
from countries with poor institutions, corruption, or discrimination.  
There has also been considerable debate in the empirical literature about the average skill 
level of immigrants to the United States. For our purpose, three sets of findings stand out: (1) 
Borjas (1999) and Betts and Lofstrom (2000) find a negative trend in the skill level of 
immigrants relative to the native U.S. population over the 1970s and 1980s; (2) Cohen, Zack and 
Chiswick (1997) and Barrett (1996) find that the decreasing trend in immigrant skill level over 
the 1970s ended by the mid-1980s, and; (3) Polgreen and Simpson (2006) confirm the trends 
found in the previous studies above using data from 1972-2000, but find that the upward trend 
that began in the mid-1980s reverted to a decline by 1994. For a more comprehensive survey of 
the empirical literature on immigrant self-selection, we refer the reader to Borjas (1994). 
Polgreen and Simpson (2006) is an important launching point for this study because it covers 
the most comprehensive sample period and offers a technique for measuring the education levels 
of immigrants in the years they arrived. Previous studies measured immigrant education by using 
census data for the education of the foreign born population living in the U.S. or by using wages 6 
 
as a proxy. Neither of these measures directly addresses the issue of immigrant selection at the 
time they arrive.  
 
III.  EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY 
The specification of the empirical model is a straightforward extension of the model in 
Polgreen and Simpson (2006), which includes immigrant type, visa class, and region to explain 
the variation in the education of immigrants over time. They are able to attribute the trends in 
immigrant selection to three sources: (1) changes in the education and visa status of non-
immigrant residents; (2) policy changes, and; (3) demographic changes in immigrants' countries 
of origin.  
Our goal is to investigate their third conclusion in greater detail to try to identify the country 
characteristics that affect the education of immigrants to the US. Specifically, we plan to 
evaluate whether the selection of immigrants is influenced more by the institutions and 
educational endowments in their countries of origin, or by the moving costs of immigrating 
relative to the benefits.  
The model we estimate is:  
 
where new is a dummy variable indicating whether the visa is being issued to a new entrant; 
 is a time-trend polynomial chosen to approximate the trend in immigrant skill 
over time observed by the existing literature; visa  is a set of dummy variables for the 7 
 
immigrants’ visa class (family, employment, refugee, diversity, Immigration Reform and Control 
Act, or “other”); region is a set of region-of-origin dummy variables, and; Z are the country 
characteristics we are interested in. The details of these variables will be described in more detail 
in the next section. 
We will employ a quantile regression as our estimation strategy to try to capture how the 
impacts of the variables vary for different levels of the distribution. Quantile regression estimates 
the treatment effects at a given quantile of the distribution by minimizing a weighted sum of the 
absolute deviations. Specifically, quantile regression solves:  
(3)  ,  
where   is the selected quantile and I(*) is an indicator function equal to one if the error 
term, y – Xβ, is negative. A summary of this strategy can be found in Koenker (2005). 
Quantile regression is useful because the explanatory variables of interest may have different 
marginal effects for observations in the tails of the distribution of immigrants than they do at the 
center. Quantile regression allows us to measure these differences without making restrictive 
assumptions. Also, quantile regression helps account for individual heterogeneity that cannot be 
easily corrected using instrumental variables (Arias et al. 2001). There are also economic reasons 
that quantile regression is useful for describing the skills of immigrants. First, the theories about 
selection have more to do with how variables affect skill selection in the tail of the distribution. 
Secondly, estimating the conditional quantile helps account for the fact that education may be a 
“lumpy” investment, in that individuals “drop out” after well-defined intervals. 
 
IV. DATA 
For the sample period 1988-2000, data for immigrants to the U.S. come from “Immigrants 
Admitted to the United States” published by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 8 
 
Immigrant characteristics in this dataset are: year of admission; visa class; countries of birth, last 
residence, and quota chargeability; age; occupation; marital status; gender; type (new admission 
or a visa adjustment non-immigrant foreign residents); intended US state and city of residence, 
and; labor certification status.  
The INS data does not directly report immigrants' education levels, so we adopt the data 
constructed by Polgreen and Simpson (2006), who estimate immigrants' education based on their 
occupation and other characteristics in the INS dataset. Using data for U.S. natives from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), they estimated the following equation for each occupation, k: 
(4)  . 
The goal of constructing the education variable this way is to capture the variations in 
educational attainment caused by variations in observed characteristics.  
This measure of immigrant education has disadvantages, which are discussed in Polgreen and 
Simpson (2006), and which we will summarize here. First, it only measures the education of 
immigrants who report a useful occupation. Immigrants who are children, retirees, students, 
unemployed, homemakers, or do not report an occupation comprise about 65% of the immigrants 
who entered during the sample period. Fortunately, these numbers have been relatively stable 
over that time so any bias that their omission may introduce is not fluctuating much. Secondly, 
immigrants are less likely to be matched into their primary occupation than natives. This may be 
related to licensing and other entry barriers. Chiswick (2008) finds that immigrants have a flatter 
distribution of wages across different skill levels, and partly attributes this to occupational 
mismatching. However, while skill mismatching may affect immigrants' wage distribution after 
they arrive, it does not necessarily reflect on their ability when they decided to leave home. 
Econometric problems with constructed variables include measurement error described by 9 
 
Bollinger and Hirsch (2006). This may not seriously impact the elasticities we estimate as long 
as the bias is proportional to the actual levels of education.  
Despite these shortcomings, we feel that the INS data still give the best snapshot at the time 
of arrival and therefore did a better job of addressing our main question. Some studies look at 
immigrants' occupations, wages and education levels using the CPS. While using the CPS might 
overcome some of the difficulties described above, it too is flawed because the CPS does not 
provide information about the characteristics of immigrants when they arrived and therefore does 
not answer the selection question. The CPS also includes undocumented immigrants, whose 
selection may be distorted by other factors.
1  
Summary statistics of the education variable are reported by country in Table 1. Columns (1) 
through (3) show the region, country, and number of immigrants from each country. The 
headcounts show that the countries which sent the most immigrants during this period were 
Mexico, The Philippines, and India. However, since the dataset deals specifically with legal 
immigration, it is not dominated by any single country or geographic region. This is because 
since 1965 U.S. immigration policy has set a single aggregate quota for the world, with a 
uniform percentage cap for the total from any single country.
2 Columns (4) through (7) report the 
mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values for the constructed education variable 
for immigrants from each of the countries. The last two columns of Table 1 show the average 
educational attainments of these immigrants' countries of origin in 1960 and 2000, respectively. 
Comparing these figures to column (4) of the table suggest that, while there may have been a 
downward trend in the education of immigrants at certain times during the sample period, it is 
                                                 
1 For example, illegal immigrants may be selected because they have less to lose from being barred legal entry for 
life and thus tend to be lower-skilled.  
2 Quota exceptions include: (1) refugees, and; (2) the Western Hemisphere. Immigration from the Western 
Hemisphere had not fallen subject to quotas before 1965when a quota was added at a level of twice the quota 
allocated to the rest of the world. 10 
 
unlikely that there was ever negative selection relative to the distribution of skill in immigrants' 
home countries.  
The first group of explanatory variables we choose to include in our estimation of equation 
(1) are: type of case (new or adjusted), region of origin, visa class, and year from the INS dataset. 
Type of case is a dummy variable equal to one for new immigrants and zero for adjustments in 
the visa status of foreign residents already in the United States. Regions are included as dummy 
variables for immigrants coming from Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, Oceania, 
and South America, leaving North America and the Caribbean as the benchmark group. Visa 
class includes dummy variables for family members of U.S. residents,
3 employment visas,
4 




7 with refugees serving as the benchmark group. We also included polynomial 
function of the year the visa was issued to approximate the changes in the trends of immigrant 
education described in previous studies.  
We then add several country characteristics. They are: population and real per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI); the 
corruption index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG); distance and dummy 
variables for English-speaking countries and countries with a shared colonial history with the US 
from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII), and; average 
educational attainment in each immigrant’s home country from Barro and Lee (2001). Because 
of limited availability of the ICRG and education data for several countries, the final sample 
consisted of about 1.8 million legal immigrants between 1988 and 2000.  
                                                 
3 Using the 29 classifications in the 2000 INS dataset, family visas included classifications 1-4, 14-18, and 21.  
4 Classifications 5-9.  
5 Classifications 22, 26, and 27. 
6 Classifications 13 and 23.  
7 Classification 29. 11 
 
The variables we are most interested in are corruption, distance, and educational attainment 
in the immigrants' countries of origin. Corruption is included to determine how poor institutions 
in developing countries influence the problem of brain drain and is predicted to have a positive 
impact on immigrant education. Next, it is predicted that distance variable will not only reduce 
the quantity of immigrants in the context of "gravity," but it will also improve the quality of 
immigrants.
8 Chiswick (2000) predicts that higher moving costs will lead to favorable selection 
and rule out negative selection. Finally, average education in each immigrant's country of origin 
is used to measure that country's endowment of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor, which 
may impact the returns to human capital in that country and the incentives to emigrate. Mundell 
(1957) and Borjas (1987) predict immigrants from countries with more skilled workers will be 
better-educated in both absolute and relative terms. Summary statistics for all explanatory 
variables are reported in Table 2. 
 
V. RESULTS 
In this section, we highlight the empirical findings from: (1) OLS regression, to get an idea of 
the marginal effects around the mean, and; (2) quantile regression, to show how those impacts 
may vary at different levels of the skill distribution and; (3) ordered probit regression, to test the 
sensitivity of the results to small errors in the measurement of the education variable. 
OLS Results 
OLS estimation results for several specifications of equation (1) are reported in Table 3, with 
standard errors in parentheses. The specification in column (1) excludes country characteristics, 
Z. These results are consistent with Polgreen and Simpson (2006) in the sense that there is 
                                                 
8 The relationship between trade cost and value is one common to the literature on trade in goods and services. A 
review by Leamer (2006) discusses various concepts of geography in economics in the context of Thomas 
Friedman’s popular notion of “flatness.”   12 
 
similar variation on the basis of visa class, region, and type, and the time-trend displays similar 
breaks as those documented in their analysis.  
OLS estimates including country characteristics, Z, appear in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3. 
Column (2) includes only the control variables of GDP, population, language and colonial 
history variables and column (3) includes these characteristics as well as the corruption, distance 
and country of origin education variables we are interested in testing. Comparing these 
specifications the year, visa, and regional variables we see that there is not much change in the 
signs or magnitudes of their coefficients across specifications. The only place that we do notice 
some change is in the regional dummy variables, but these changes are not unexpected since 
distance and institutional quality are similar among geographic neighbors and political friends. 
The coefficients on the country control variables are virtually unchanged when we add 
corruption, distance and education in the country of origin.  
Finally, column (4) shows the results from running OLS on equation (1) excluding the linear 
term of the polynomial time trend. The reason for including this specification is that quantile 
regression does not lead to an analytical solution, and therefore is both less stable and more 
sensitive to correlations among the explanatory variables than OLS is. Estimating equation (1), 
quantile regression was forced to drop the year variable. There are virtually no differences in the 
variables of interest between columns (3) and (4). Therefore, the rest of this subsection will focus 
on the results in Table 3, column (4). 
The first group of country characteristics is the group of variables that control for population, 
GDP per capita, and dummy variables for English-speaking countries and countries that share a 
common colonial history with the United States. They tell us that immigrants from countries 
with historically large populations that speak English are more educated, while immigrants from 13 
 
countries whose populations have grown most, have the higher GDPs per capita, and which share 
a colonial history with the United States are less educated.  
The coefficients on the corruption index, distance, and average educational attainment 
variables reveal that: (1) immigrants from more corrupt governments are better-educated; (2) 
moving costs improve immigrant quality, and; (3) immigrants from countries with higher 
education levels are themselves better educated. However, there is no evidence that this rises to 
the level of "positive selection" on the basis of skill endowments or the returns to human capital.  
The corruption index's coefficient tells us that countries with higher levels of corruption in 
government send more educated immigrants to the United States. As a result, a one-point 
worsening in a country's ICRG corruption index will result in immigrants to the U.S. who are 
11.3% more educated, on average. In years, a one standard deviation change in the corruption 
levels in a country will increase the expected educational levels of its immigrants by about 0.29 
years. This result is consistent with the Docquier and Rappaport (2003) model of skilled 
migration. The sign of the distance variable is also positive and significant. Although the 
magnitude its elasticity is small (0.038), it is not of lesser importance. A one standard deviation 
change in the distance from the U.S. leads to about a 0.37 year increase in immigrants' education, 
which is more than the impact of corruption. This result supports the predictions of models 
involving moving costs, which include Chiswick (2000) and Borjas (1987). 
The impact of education in immigrants' countries of origin is more complicated. Increases in 
a country's current average level of education increases the quality of its immigrants, even when 
controlling for 1960 educational attainment rates. The elasticity for country of origin average 
education in 1960 was about -0.007, meaning that slightly less-educated immigrants to the U.S. 
came from countries with higher initial education levels. At the same time, the elasticity of 
current educational attainment was estimated to be about 0.03. This shows that better-educated 14 
 
immigrants came from countries with higher current educational attainments and improvements 
in educational attainment rates since 1960. However, neither of these results supports the notion 
that immigrants from countries with higher skill endowments are positively selected. To 
determine this, we must test whether this elasticity is greater than one, which cannot be rejected. 
Therefore, even if negative selection from low-skill countries is possible, it seems unlikely that it 
follows the pattern described in Mundell (1957) or Borjas (1987).  
Quantile Regression Results 
The next step is to see how the marginal impacts of these variables vary throughout the 
distribution and then see what the predicted values from the quantile regressions show about the 
distribution of immigrants' skills. The Table 4 shows the estimated quantile coefficients for 
selected quantiles (τ = 0.05, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.95) with standard errors in parentheses. This 
table tracks the changes in the impacts of various factors and the statistical significance of those 
factors at different quantiles. For example, 1960 educational attainment in an immigrant's 
country of origin stands out because its impact is significantly positive (0.011) for immigrants in 
the 5
th percentile but significantly negative (-0.036) for immigrants in the 95
th percentile. For 
other variables, the coefficients do not change in sign or significance, but nonetheless vary 
substantially, as corruption does (0.024 at the 5
th percentile and rising to 0.169 at the 95
th). 
Figures 1 through 4 illustrate the variations in the coefficients for the four variables of 
interest (corruption, distance, average education, and average education in 1960) more clearly. In 
each figure the solid black line connects the observed values of the estimated quantile regression 
coefficients at every fifth percentile between the 5
th and 95
th. The smooth, grey curve fits a sixth-
order polynomial trendline to the estimated quantile coefficients, and the horizontal dashed line 
references the OLS estimate. Confidence interval bands are not included because the standard 
errors are extremely small and the lines are almost indistinguishable.   15 
 
First, Figure 1 shows the quantile regression coefficients for the corruption index in the 
immigrant's country of origin across quantiles. It shows that the impact of corruption is relatively 
weak for lower-skilled immigrants, but progressively stronger for immigrants at higher skill 
levels. This strengthens the case supporting models related to brain drain and institutions.  
Next, Figure 2 plots the elasticity of distance on immigrants' education levels across 
quantiles. Moving costs improve the overall quality of immigrants at all skill levels, but its 
importance is less for low-skill immigrants. The upward trend in the value of the estimated 
coefficient is fairly consistent beginning with a value of 0.004 at the 5
th percentile, and rising 
above 0.052 at the 95
th. While this generally confirms theoretical predictions about the impact of 
moving costs, it is unclear why these costs would impact higher skill levels more than lower 
ones. One explanation is that for low skill immigrants living Mexico or other Latin American 
countries, waiting for the opportunity to migrate legally has a high opportunity cost. Instead of 
waiting, they can obtain similar benefits by exploiting legal seasonal opportunities in border 
communities that do not require a visa, or by immigrating illegally. These immigrants are not 
captured by the INS data.   
Finally, Figures 3 and 4 show the effects of education levels in the immigrant's country of 
origin. Figure 3 graphs the coefficient for the elasticity of the 1960 average educational 
attainment in an immigrant's country of origin. It shows a declining trend and a reversal in sign 
for this coefficient across quantiles, starting at 0.011 at the 5
th percentile and falling to -0.035 at 
the 95
th. The OLS coefficient falls in between at -0.007. Figure 4 shows the quantile regression 
coefficients for average years of education in the immigrant's host country. In contrast to the 
previous three figures, this coefficient does not display a dominant upward or downward trend 
over the quantiles of immigrant skill. Also, the sign its impact is negative (and significant) for 
low skill levels (about -0.016), before becoming positive at about the 15
th percentile, and 16 
 
remaining positive for middle and higher skill immigrants. The size of the impact of education 
peaks at a value of 0.058 in the 60
th percentile of immigrant skill before falling to about 0.010 at 
the 95
th percentile.   
Robustness 
The question next we ask is: How sensitive are the patterns described above slight changes in 
how we define the dependent variable? What if the education of a native-born construction 
worker poorly reflects the education of an immigrant construction worker? Are the marginal 
effects and trends described in this section still valid? To answer this, we converted the 
constructed education variable into a categorical variable with five different skill groups. These 
five skill categories are: (1) 11 or fewer constructed years of education; (2) between 11 and 13 
constructed years of education; (3) between 13 and 15 constructed years of education; (4) 
between 15 and 17 constructed years of education, and; (5) more than 17 years of constructed 
education. The result is a variable that assigns individuals into broad skill classifications that 
mostly reflect their occupational selection.
9 Across the bottom row of Table 5 we report the 
number of immigrants who fall into each of the skill groups below each group's marginal effects 
coefficients.  
Categorizing the estimated skill will sort them mostly on the basis of occupation and make 
the results less sensitive to small discrepancies in education levels across immigrants from 
different countries or the choice of conditioning variables used in its construction. Since we 
control for most other attributes, the only reason this approach should be a problem would be if 
the ordering of occupations on the basis of skill differed greatly across countries. In other words, 
the fact that German and Chinese engineers and construction workers have different absolute 
                                                 
9 We could have simply subjectively assigned each occupation as "skilled" or "unskilled" and run a logit regression. 
In fact, this was one of our first experiments. The results were similar to those obtained from performing OLS on the 
constructed years of education.  17 
 
levels of education would not necessarily pose a problem, as long as engineers and construction 
workers are ranked similarly relative to other occupations in each country.  
The coefficients in column (1) of Table 5 are the coefficients of the ordered probit regression 
using this measure categorical skill as the dependent variable. Comparing these results to column 
(3) of Table 3, there do not seem to be any differences that would seem to invalidate the basic 
conclusions from the OLS in terms of signs or significance levels. Columns (2) through (6) of 
Table 5 show the marginal effects of these variables throughout the distribution. In these 
columns the signs of the marginal effects are expected to vary some from the coefficients 
obtained in the quantile regression because the probabilities must sum to one (and therefore each 
set of marginal effects must sum to zero). Looking across the rows for corruption, distance, and 
educational attainment, the marginal effects follow similar patterns to those plotted in Figures 1 
through 4. This suggests that measurement errors and bias introduced by the construction of the 
variable we use for immigrants' education are unlikely to be having extreme consequences for 
the qualitative nature of our results.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In the Mundell and Borjas-Roy models of immigration, higher skill endowments in the 
immigrants' country of origin lead to higher education levels for immigrants and even positive 
selection. Our results support the hypothesis that higher attainment rates produce a higher quality 
of immigrants, but this effect is not strong enough to support positive selection relative to the 
average non-migrant. This affirms the interpretation of the data offered by Jasso and Rosenzweig 
(1990). On the other hand, the human capital model advocated in Chiswick (2000) suggests that 
moving costs play a more prominent role and that positive selection is the most likely outcome of 
migration. Our results are more consistent with these predictions. Moving costs such as distance, 18 
 
language, and colonial history did play an important role. Finally, our results offer strong support 
for the role of institutions in the quality of immigrants in a way that is consistent with models of 
brain drain and discrimination. 
More importantly, this paper raises some new and important questions for the direction of 
research in the area. First, immigration policy and human capital investment choices may both 
play roles in explaining why negative self-selection is so unlikely. Introducing these factors as 
part of the decision sequence may shed light on the results we have found. Yet another question 
concerns welfare and income distribution for natives in the receiving country. While it is often 
presumed that stricter immigration quotas will foster positive selection and would therefore 
benefit natives more, the case for this is not clear cut, and the potential impacts of these policy 
choices on selection need to be investigated carefully. A third issue concerns welfare and 
development in poor countries, and the problem of brain drain. We have found evidence that 
immigrants from poorer countries are well-educated relative to those who do not migrate and this 
selection bias is magnified by poor institutions and low rates of overall educational attainment in 
those countries. This may pose an obstacle to development in these countries. 
Our results generally agree with Polgreen and Simpson (2006), who show that much of the 
difference in the education of immigrants can be explained by changes in the countries of origin 
from which immigrants have come over time. We advance the literature by describing what 
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Summary Statistics for Education of Immigrants by Country of Origin 
 
Constructed Immigrants'  
Years of Education  
Country of Origin 
Ave. Education  Region  Immigrants' 
Countries of Origin  Number of 
Immigrants Mean S.D.  Min  Max  1960  2000 
Afr. Algeria  2,019 14.12 2.15 9.17 18.73  0.97 4.72
Afr. Botswana  37 14.18 1.92 10.96 18.16  1.46 5.35
Afr. Cameroon  1,429 13.82 2.11 9.76 18.72  1.37 3.17
Afr. Congo  53 14.13 1.94 11.16 18.48  1.93 4.68
Afr. Egypt  16,167 14.39 2.24 9.15 19.52  1.32 5.05
Afr. Gambia  463 12.72 1.62 9.59 18.43  0.50 1.86
Afr. Ghana  10,466 12.96 1.94 9.40 19.08  0.69 4.01
Afr. Kenya  4,211 13.85 1.97 9.70 18.66  1.20 3.99
Afr. Liberia  4,079 12.99 1.98 9.12 19.08  0.56 2.26
Afr. Malawi  214 13.98 2.10 10.62 18.62  1.70 2.58
Afr. Mali  295 12.56 1.65 10.57 18.48  0.17 0.76
Afr. Mozambique  245 12.89 1.77 10.46 18.61  0.26 1.19
Afr. Niger  602 13.63 2.23 9.52 18.56  0.20 .
Afr. Senegal  1,173 12.83 1.69 9.47 18.42  1.60 2.23
Afr. Sierra  Leone  3,425 13.07 1.86 9.30 18.73  0.53 1.99
Afr. South  Africa  8,928 14.36 1.84 9.50 18.75  4.08 7.87
Afr. Sudan  3,439 12.92 2.12 9.45 18.93  0.29 1.91
Afr. Togo  316 12.94 1.95 10.32 18.57  0.32 2.83
Afr. Tunisia  920 13.92 1.98 9.77 18.93  0.54 4.20
Afr. Uganda  1,812 13.78 2.02 9.60 18.64  1.10 2.95
Afr. Zaire  844 13.12 2.02 9.77 18.50  0.56 3.18
Afr. Zambia  693 14.32 1.80 10.40 18.55  1.60 5.43
Afr. Zimbabwe  1,237 14.22 1.77 10.08 18.83  1.54 4.88
Asia Bahrain  144 14.55 1.78 11.00 18.55  1.37 6.09
Asia Cyprus  889 13.95 2.04 9.66 18.65  4.29 8.77
Asia Hong  Kong  33,212 13.70 1.66 9.57 19.43  4.74 9.47
Asia India  110,804 14.33 2.33 8.73 19.92  1.45 4.77
Asia Indonesia  6,260 13.80 1.84 9.57 19.18  1.11 4.71
Asia Iran  38,431 13.54 2.11 8.93 19.57  0.63 4.66
Asia Israel  11,945 13.94 2.00 9.48 19.18  6.99 9.23
Asia Japan  19,689 13.58 1.69 9.54 19.33  6.87 9.72
Asia Jordan  10,704 13.21 2.08 9.04 18.98  1.40 7.37
Asia Korea  41,355 13.60 2.17 9.09 19.67  3.23 10.46
Asia Kuwait  918 13.84 1.89 10.80 18.46  2.59 7.05
Asia Malaysia  7,065 14.00 1.85 9.84 18.70  2.34 7.88
Asia Pakistan  25,114 13.82 2.44 8.97 19.72  0.63 2.45
Asia Philippines  178,353 13.19 2.15 8.69 19.47  3.77 7.62
Asia Singapore  2,253 14.27 1.72 9.80 20.03  3.14 8.12
Asia Sri  Lanka  4,477 14.20 2.11 9.85 18.98  3.43 6.09
Asia Syria  7,313 13.84 2.53 9.33 19.23  0.99 5.74
Asia Thailand  9,438 12.98 1.73 9.06 18.78  3.45 6.10
Asia Turkey  9,142 13.55 2.11 8.95 19.53  2.00 4.8022 
 
E. Eur.  Bulgaria  5,097 13.76 2.24 9.77 18.98  6.08 9.74
E. Eur.  Former USSR  24,784 12.83 2.02 8.66 19.08  7.59 10.49
E. Eur.  Hungary  4,713 13.32 2.20 9.11 19.47  6.65 8.81
E. Eur.  Malta  279 13.36 1.90 10.27 18.56  5.64 7.57
E. Eur.  Poland  80,642 12.84 2.01 9.00 19.33  6.74 9.90
E. Eur.  Romania  18,677 12.95 2.16 8.86 19.28  5.33 9.51
E. Eur.  Yugoslavia  8,047 13.09 2.23 8.94 19.08  5.08 7.48
N. Am.  Canada  55,629 14.01 1.83 9.15 19.42  8.37 11.43
N. Am.  Costa Rica  3,930 12.46 1.86 9.04 18.57  3.86 6.01
N. Am.  Dominican Republic  98,132 12.15 1.82 8.54 19.18  2.38 5.17
N. Am.  El Salvador  62,989 11.56 0.91 8.91 18.59  1.70 4.50
N. Am.  Guatemala  23,747 11.80 1.43 8.84 19.03  1.43 3.12
N. Am.  Haiti  28,665 12.07 1.80 8.58 19.87  0.70 2.67
N. Am.  Honduras  17,960 11.94 1.55 9.00 19.28  1.69 4.08
N. Am.  Jamaica  68,728 12.08 1.54 8.61 18.87  2.46 5.22
N. Am.  Mexico  279,495 11.55 1.08 8.50 18.72  2.41 6.73
N. Am.  Nicaragua  26,714 11.98 1.53 8.81 18.73  2.09 4.42
N. Am.  Panama  6,887 13.04 1.86 9.02 18.93  4.26 7.90
N. Am.  Trinidad & Tobago  19,863 12.56 1.75 8.60 18.83  4.19 7.62
N. Am.  United States  295 14.19 2.09 9.54 19.23  8.66 12.25
Ocean Australia  8,626 14.03 1.81 9.70 18.98  9.43 10.57
Ocean New  Zealand  3,964 13.81 1.83 9.97 19.42  9.56 11.52
Ocean Papua  New  Guinea  51 14.09 1.83 10.97 18.42  1.13 2.39
S. Am.  Argentina  9,471 13.74 2.13 9.02 18.93  4.99 8.49
S. Am.  Bolivia  4,846 12.55 1.88 9.18 19.42  4.22 5.54
S. Am.  Brazil  13,800 13.27 2.02 9.42 19.03  2.83 4.56
S. Am.  Chile  5,812 13.03 2.01 8.96 19.33  4.99 7.89
S. Am.  Colombia  38,349 11.98 1.85 9.04 19.62  2.97 5.01
S. Am.  Ecuador  21,202 12.29 1.70 8.88 18.72  2.95 6.52
S. Am.  Guyana  26,979 12.32 1.75 8.98 19.13  3.50 6.05
S. Am.  Paraguay  1,017 12.52 1.89 9.67 18.60  3.35 5.74
S. Am.  Peru  32,367 12.41 1.85 8.54 19.57  3.02 7.33
S. Am.  Uruguay  2,236 12.77 1.97 9.62 18.78  5.03 7.25
S. Am.  Venezuela  7,159 13.77 2.04 9.34 19.28  2.53 5.61
W Eur.  Austria  2,199 13.75 1.86 9.20 19.28  6.71 8.80
W Eur.  Belgium  2,342 14.27 1.88 9.65 19.47  7.46 8.73
W Eur.  Denmark  2,718 13.82 1.77 9.43 18.70  8.95 10.09
W Eur.  Finland  1,889 13.86 1.82 9.46 18.88  5.37 10.14
W Eur.  France  10,837 13.90 1.79 9.54 19.23  5.78 8.37
W Eur.  Germany  23,226 13.55 1.82 8.99 19.08  8.40 9.75
W Eur.  Greece  5,659 13.29 2.24 9.29 19.57  4.64 8.51
W Eur.  Iceland  557 14.03 2.05 10.23 18.51  5.63 8.75
W Eur.  Ireland  51,564 13.03 1.73 9.27 18.83  6.45 9.02
W Eur.  Italy  9,108 13.22 2.04 8.69 18.98  4.56 7.00
W Eur.  Netherlands  5,857 14.04 1.82 9.64 19.03  5.27 9.24
W Eur.  Norway  1,989 13.85 1.73 9.89 18.68  6.11 11.86
W Eur.  Portugal  10,161 11.82 1.28 9.07 19.40  1.94 4.91
W Eur.  Spain  5,174 13.74 2.14 8.77 19.23  3.64 7.25
W Eur.  Switzerland  4,014 14.04 1.83 9.46 18.59  7.30 10.39 
 
TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables 
 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
New Immigrants  0.657 0.475    
Asia Region  0.299 0.458    
Regions    
East Europe   0.082 0.275    
West Europe  0.080 0.271    
Africa 0.036 0.187    
Oceania   0.007 0.085    
South America   0.094 0.292    
Visa Classes    
Family   0.658 0.474    
Employment   0.141 0.348    
Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) Amnesty   0.017 0.128    
"Other" Visa Classes  0.055 0.229    
Diversity   0.064 0.245    
Country of Origin Characteristics   
ln(Population) 17.180 1.601 12.429  20.688
ln(Population in 1960)  8.714 1.594 4.078  12.133
ln(GDP per capita)  7.834 1.202 3.799  10.519
Corruption Index  0.556 0.201 0.000  1.000
ln(Average Education)  1.733 0.407 -0.868  2.500
ln(Average Education in 1960)  1.030 0.675 -1.772  2.258
English-Speaking Country of Origin  0.781 0.413 0.000  1.000
Shared Colonial History (with U.S.)   0.112 0.316 0.000  1.000
Distance from U.S. (miles)  7,160 4,240 1,850  1,550
Number of Observations  1,729,019      24 
 
TABLE 3 
OLS Results (Dependent Variable = ln[Constructed Immigrant Education]).
b 
 




** (5.507)  2.638
** (0.050) 
New Immigrants  -0.023
** (0.000) -0.023
** (0.000) -0.022
















** (0.000)  -5.68e-7
** (0.000) 
Asia   0.105
** (0.000) 0.107
** (0.000) 0.035
** (0.001)  0.034
** (0.001) 
East Europe  0.068
** (0.000) 0.001   . (0.001) -0.080
** (0.001)  -0.080
** (0.001) 
West Europe  0.088
** (0.000) 0.024
** (0.001) -0.031









** (0.001) -0.004  
* (0.002)  -0.005
  * (0.002) 
South America  0.030
** (0.000) 0.028



















** (0.001)  0.058
** (0.001) 
IRCA Amnesty  0.008
** (0.001) 0.007
** (0.001) 0.024
** (0.001)  0.023
** (0.001) 
ln(Population  in 1960)      0.077
** (0.000) 0.072
** (0.001)  0.072
** (0.001) 
ln(Population)     -0.074
** (0.000) -0.067
** (0.001)  -0.067
** (0.001) 
ln(GDP per capita)      -0.002
** (0.000) -0.016
** (0.000)  -0.016
** (0.000) 
English-Speaking     0.006
** (0.000) 0.001
** (0.000)  0.001
** (0.000) 
Shared Colonial History      -0.021
** (0.000) -0.023
** (0.001)  -0.024
** (0.001) 
Corruption Index        0.115
** (0.001)  0.113
** (0.001) 
ln(Distance from U.S.)        0.037
** (0.001)  0.038
** (0.001) 
ln(Ave. Education in 1960)          -0.007
** (0.001)  -0.007
** (0.001) 
ln(Average Education)          0.029
** (0.001)  0.030
** (0.001) 
Adjusted R
2  0.188  0.205  0.216   0.216
Log-Likelihood    983,594  1,002,141  1,014,200   1,013,884
Akaike Info Criterion         
b Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Indicates significance at the 10% level. 
** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 25 
 
TABLE 4 
Selected Quantile Regression Results (Dependent Variable = ln[Immigrants’ Education]), Unrestricted Model.
b 
 
Variable 0.05  0.25  0.50  0.75  0.95 
Constant 1.412
**  (0.055)) 1.715
**  (0.032)  2.564
**  (0.037)  4.734
**  (0.044)  4.609
**  (0.116) 
New Immigrants  -0.028
**  (0.000) -0.026
**  (0.000)  -0.022
**  (0.000)  -0.013
**  (0.000)  0.007
**  (0.001) 
Year
2 3.84e-4
**  (0.000) 3.27e-4
**  (0.000)  1.09e-4
**  (0.000)  -4.54e-4
**  (0.000)  -4.52e-4
**  (0.000) 
Year
3 -2.85e-6
**  (0.000) -2.46e-6
**  (0.000)  -8.68e-7
**  (0.000)  3.16e-6
**  (0.000)  3.20e-6
**  (0.000) 
Asia 0.022
**  (0.001) 0.025
**  (0.001)  0.055
**  (0.001)  0.097
**  (0.001)  0.047
**  (0.003) 
East Europe  -0.023
**  (0.001) -0.078
**  (0.001)  -0.116
**  (0.001)  -0.063
**  (0.001)  -0.049
**  (0.003) 
West Europe  0.003
**  (0.001) -0.036
**  (0.001)  -0.034
**  (0.001)  -0.008
**  (0.001)  -0.049
**  (0.002) 
Africa 0.065
**  (0.002) 0.051
**  (0.001)  0.068
**  (0.001)  0.120
**  (0.001)  0.049
**  (0.003) 
Oceania 0.023
**  (0.002) 0.010
**  (0.001)  0.006
**  (0.001)  0.027
**  (0.002)  -0.031
**  (0.004) 
South America  0.000   .  (0.001) -0.019
**  (0.000)  -0.021
**  (0.000)  0.051
**  (0.001)  0.051
**  (0.002) 
Family 0.004
**  (0.001) 0.024
**  (0.000)  0.043
**  (0.000)  0.033
**  (0.000)  0.045
**  (0.001) 
Employment 0.042
**  (0.001) 0.087
**  (0.000)  0.150
**  (0.000)  0.106
**  (0.000)  0.082
**  (0.001) 
IRCA Amnesty  0.024
**  (0.001) 0.027
**  (0.001)  0.049
**  (0.001)  0.015
**  (0.001)  -0.090
**  (0.002) 
Other  0.001   .  (0.001) 0.024
**  (0.000)  0.082
**  (0.000)  0.068
**  (0.001)  0.035
**  (0.002) 
Diversity 0.030
**  (0.001) 0.037
**  (0.000)  0.069
**  (0.000)  0.052
**  (0.001)  0.031
**  (0.002) 
ln(Population in 1960)  0.019
**  (0.001) 0.047
**  (0.000)  0.085
**  (0.000)  0.116
**  (0.000)  0.111
**  (0.001) 
ln(Population) -0.020
**  (0.001) -0.043
**  (0.000)  -0.077
**  (0.000)  -0.115
**  (0.000)  -0.110
**  (0.001) 
ln(GDP-per capita)  0.007
**  (0.000) -0.003
**  (0.000)  -0.020
**  (0.000)  -0.031
**  (0.000)  -0.018
**  (0.001) 
English-Speaking -0.002
**  (0.000) 0.002
**  (0.000)  0.009
**  (0.000)  -0.009
**  (0.000)  0.004
**  (0.001) 
Colonial History  -0.030
**  (0.001) -0.048
**  (0.000)  -0.015
**  (0.000)  -0.007
**  (0.000)  -0.023
**  (0.001) 
ln(Distance from US)  0.004
**  (0.001) 0.019
**  (0.001)  0.031
**  (0.001)  0.027
**  (0.001)  0.052
**  (0.002) 
Corruption Index  0.024
**  (0.001) 0.055
**  (0.001)  0.108
**  (0.001)  0.165
**  (0.001)  0.169
**  (0.002) 
ln(Education in 1960)  0.011
**  (0.001) 0.009
**  (0.000)  -0.007
**  (0.000)  -0.013
**  (0.000)  -0.036
**  (0.001) 
ln(Ave. Education)  -0.012
**  (0.001) 0.009
**  (0.001)  0.041
**  (0.001)  0.051
**  (0.001)  0.010
**  (0.002) 
Pseudo-R
2  0.058   .  0.061   .  0.177   .  0.180   .  0.084   . 
b Standard errors in parentheses.  
* Indicates significance from zero at the 10% level.  
** Indicates significance from zero at the 1% level. 26 
 
TABLE 5 
Ordered Probit Results (Dependent Variable = Skill Category)
b 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     Marginal  Effects 
        1 2 3 4 5 
Year
2 5.82e-4
**(0.000) -1.24e-4 -9.05e-5 9.13e-5 9.30e-5  3.06e-5
Year
3 -5.12e-6
**(0.000) 1.09e-6 7.96e-7 -8.03e-7 -8.18e-7  -2.69e-7
New Immigrants  -0.181
**(0.002) 0.037 0.030 -0.028 -0.030  -0.010
Asia 0.226
**(0.010) -0.046 -0.039 0.034 0.037  0.013
East Europe  -0.491
**(0.009) 0.129 0.034 -0.081 -0.064  -0.017
West Europe  -0.190
**(0.008) 0.044 0.023 -0.031 -0.028  -0.009
Africa 0.392
**(0.010) -0.068 -0.084 0.052 0.071  0.030
Oceania -0.029
  *(0.014) 0.006 0.004 -0.005 -0.005  -0.001
South America  -0.002   .(0.005) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
Family   0.269
**(0.004) -0.060 -0.037 0.043 0.041  0.013
Employment   0.832
**(0.004) -0.125 -0.196 0.087 0.154  0.080
Other   0.448
**(0.005) -0.076 -0.098 0.057 0.081  0.035
Diversity   0.434
**(0.005) -0.074 -0.094 0.056 0.078  0.033
IRCA Amnesty   0.122
**(0.008) -0.024 -0.022 0.018 0.020  0.007
ln(Population)   -0.458
**(0.004) 0.098 0.071 -0.072 -0.073  -0.024
ln(Population in 1960)  0.484
**(0.004) -0.104 -0.075 0.076 0.077  0.025
ln(GDP per capita)   -0.097
**(0.002) 0.021 0.015 -0.015 -0.016  -0.005
English 0.012
**(0.003) -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.002  0.001
Colonial History  -0.186
**(0.004) 0.043 0.024 -0.030 -0.028  -0.008
ln(Distance from US)   0.269
**(0.006) -0.058 -0.042 0.042 0.043  0.014
Corruption Index  0.790
**(0.007) -0.169 -0.123 0.124 0.126  0.042
ln(Ave. Education)   0.184
**(0.006) -0.039 -0.029 0.029 0.029  0.010
ln(Education in 1960)  -0.081
**(0.004) 0.017 0.013 -0.013 -0.013  -0.004
Constant   0.132 0.520 0.217  0.109  0.022
c1  -1.360
**(0.396)   
c2   0.149   .(0.396) 0.160 0.479 0.199 0.126  0.036
c3 0.879
  *(0.396)       
c4 1.770
**(0.396)       
Pseudo R
2  0.071   .        
Log-Likelihood -2,164,953        
LR  chi2(23)  332,956        
Number of Observations  1,729,019  275,768 828,234 343,677  218,434  62,906
b Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Indicates significance at the 10% level. 
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